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Abstract— The homologation of automated vehicles, being
safety-critical complex systems, requires sound evidence for
their safe operability. Traditionally, verification and validation
activities are guided by a combination of ISO 26262 and
ISO/PAS 21448, together with distance-based testing. Starting
at SAE Level 3, such approaches become infeasible, result-
ing in the need for novel methods. Scenario-based testing is
regarded as a possible enabler for verification and validation
of automated vehicles. Its effectiveness, however, rests on the
consistency and substantiality of the arguments used in each
step of the process. In this work, we sketch a generic frame-
work around scenario-based testing and analyze contemporary
approaches to the individual steps. For each step, we describe
its function, discuss proposed approaches and solutions, and
identify the underlying arguments, principles and assumptions.
As a result, we present a list of fundamental considerations for
which evidences need to be gathered in order for scenario-based
testing to support the homologation of automated vehicles.
I. INTRODUCTION
The introduction of automated vehicles (AVs) to public
roads promises many benefits. These include a reduced num-
ber of accidents caused by driver errors (safety), increased
efficiency of the transport system (environment), increased
spare time for users (comfort) and mobility for elderly and
impaired users (social inclusion) [1]. At higher levels of
automation, in particular at SAE Level ≥ 3, AVs become
complex autonomous systems operating in open context, i.e.
dealing with unstructured real world environments. Thus, the
validation and approval of AVs pose an enormous challenge
[2]. As a newly emerging and safety-critical technology,
rigorously proving safe operability and strictly avoiding
accidents is crucial for societal acceptance.
The process of assuring functional safety for conventional
road-vehicles is guided by the ISO 26262 [3]. This process
has been extended by the ISO/PAS 21448 [4] to include
the complementary aspect of the safety of the intended
functionality (SOTIF), at least for SAE Level ≤ 2. In the
automotive domain, testing is an important part of verifi-
cation and validation and has traditionally used distance-
based statistical arguments. However, for AVs, distance-
based approaches to testing become infeasible due to the vast
amount of distance that needs to be covered [5] [6]. Instead,
other approaches begin to emerge, such as ’Responsibility
Sensitive Safety’ (RSS), which is a formal model that relies
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on defining a safety envelop around the vehicle [7]. However,
it is questionable whether this formal model can actually
be implemented in the real world [8]. A novel approach,
which has been explored by recent research projects such as
PEGASUS [9] and ENABLE-S3 [10], is to perform scenario-
based testing (SBT). In SBT, testing is performed by deriving
relevant test cases from a manageable set of scenario classes.
In this paper, we perform a deep dive into the funda-
mental considerations that must be taken into account in
order for SBT to generate a meaningful contribution to the
verification and validation of AVs. The goal is to identify
underlying principles and assumptions which are essential to
the successful realization of SBT for automated driving. We
discuss relevant terminology, notation and a general frame-
work around SBT in Section II. The introduced framework
provides the structure for Section III. For each process step,
we first describe the state of the art. Secondly, we semi-
formally examine the fundamental arguments, principles,
and assumptions that are inherent to the aforementioned
contemporary approaches. The core results of our analysis
are summarized in Section IV as a condensed table, which
may serve as an impulse for future research.
II. SCENARIO-BASED TESTING
Verification and validation serves the purpose of assuring
properties of interest, such as safety and security, with respect
to both the specified and intended purpose of the system. In
the automotive domain, testing is defined as the ’process of
planning, preparing, and operating or exercising an item or an
element to verify that it satisfies specified requirements, to
detect anomalies, and to create confidence in its behavior’
[3]. In SBT, the central artifact for the operation is the
scenario. Such testing approaches are pursued as state of
the art in the AV testing community [11] [12].
A. Terminology and Notation
A standardized definition of the term scenario in the
context of verification and validation of automated vehicles is
presented in ISO/PAS 21448 [4], which we briefly introduce
alongside a semi-formalism that will be used later on.
A scenario describes the development of scenes over time,
thus building a temporal sequence. A test case is defined
as a scenario enriched with pass/fail criteria suitable for
test evaluation [4]. Menzel et al. propose the qualifications
of functional, logical and concrete scenarios [13]. At the
highest level of abstraction, a functional scenario is described
semantically using natural language.
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Fig. 1. Simplified framework around scenario-based testing based on [9] and [10]. Rectangular boxes represent process steps, whereas curved boxes
depict artifacts.
Formalizing a functional scenario, a logical scenario L
can be represented by a state space and its interrelations. It
includes a list of relevant parameters AL = (α1, . . . , αn)
and their value ranges RL = (V1, . . . , Vn) with Vi ⊆ R
for 1 ≤ i ≤ n. The state space of L can be described by
VL = V1 × · · · × Vn ⊆ Rn. Optionally, correlations between
parameters and numeric constraints can be added. Probability
distributions can be attached to the state space or the value
ranges. We denote the set of all logical scenarios by L.
A concrete scenario C requires the assignment of a single
value to each parameter. It can be obtained from a logical
scenario L by instantiating all parameters αi ∈ AL with
some vi ∈ Vi, i.e. selecting a v ∈ VL. We denote the set
of all concrete scenarios by C. Analogously, CL is the set of
all concrete scenarios derived from a logical scenario L. The
process of instantiating a set of logical scenarios to concrete
scenarios can be seen as a map I : L → C, L 7→ C ∈ CL
w.r.t. the relations, constraints and distributions of L.
B. General Framework
In order to generate the aforementioned test cases and
to interpret the test results, various steps are commonly
executed up- and downstream of the actual testing process.
Thus, it is crucial to embed SBT into a larger framework.
Figure 1 shows such an abstract framework around SBT,
mainly based on the ENABLE-S3 scenario-based verification
and validation process [10] and the PEGASUS method
[9]. Note that this framework is not meant to be a core
contribution of our work, but rather an organizational tool
for the following considerations obtained from incorporating
various existing approaches. For example, the framework is
also consistent with the publications by Huang et al. [14,
Figure 8] and Kalisvaart et al. [15, Figure 7].
The first step, scenario elicitation, consists of deriving
adequate scenario classes, e.g. in the form of logical sce-
narios. The requirement elicitation step complements these
classes by a set of safety requirements that shall be sat-
isfied by the system in the identified scenarios. Testing
then evaluates the system’s compliance to the requirements
w.r.t. the scenario classes. Well-established concepts around
testing can be found in standards such as the ISO/IEC/IEEE
29119 [16] and ISO 26262 [3]. Within this test process,
test cases are initially derived from the scenario classes and
safety requirements during test derivation. Subsequently, test
execution is performed using an appropriate test bench, e.g.
either virtually, physically or in a combination. The executed
tests are assessed in a test evaluation step. The results of this
whole process are then used in a subsequent, overarching
safety argumentation, which contributes to the safety case.
III. FUNDAMENTAL CONSIDERATIONS
Structured along this framework, we examine arguments,
principles and assumptions that, in the authors’ opinion, are
fundamental to the SBT process. We initially present some
general considerations applicable to the overall process in
Section III-A. Then, in Section III-B to Section III-F, we
conduct a two-part examination for each process step: we
first give an overview of the state of the art which is followed
by a structured analysis of the underlying fundamental con-
siderations. The key insights are marked with an ID, linking
them to Table I. We omit an in-depth analysis of the safety
argumentation, which will be subject to further research.
A. General Considerations
SBT requires a unified understanding of what the term
scenario means. As mentioned in Section II-A, ongoing stan-
dardization activities work towards this unified understand-
ing, but there remain open questions on the exact definition
and usage of scenarios and what its qualifications describe.
For example, the ISO/PAS 21448 uses logical scenarios in
the test phase while Menzel et al. propose to use concrete
scenarios [13]. Depending on these definitions, the technical
realizations of these qualifications, e.g. OpenDRIVE1 and
OpenSCENARIO2, need to be sufficiently expressive and
unambiguous such that scenario descriptions lead to test
cases without loss or misinterpretation of information (G1).
Second, SBT often assumes smoothness of certain prop-
erties of interest, e.g. of criticality metrics, behaviors or
trajectories, under variation of the parameters, i.e. slight
variations of the parameters lead to slight changes of the
considered property (G2). This smoothness can be exploited,
e.g. to extrapolate knowledge of a single scenario to a set of
scenarios or to explore the close proximity – in the sense of
parameters – of a scenario in order to estimate the direction
1asam.net/standards/detail/opendrive
2asam.net/standards/detail/openscenario
of more challenging scenarios. In both cases, this increases
the certainty of the inference from finitely many test results to
sets of scenarios when analyzing complex systems. However,
Poddey et al. [2] argue that AVs are an instance of complex
systems which rely heavily on sensor technologies for the
perception of their open context. This poses difficulties, as
processing the sensory input often uses machine learning.
These algorithms are prone to misclassifications as a result
of minor input changes [17], therefore smoothness of such
classification algorithms cannot easily be assumed.
Since the open context in which AVs are supposed to
operate is constantly evolving, the framework around SBT
has to be adaptable. A complete set of scenario classes and
testing methods at the time of elicitation may be incomplete
at time of deployment due to a number of unforeseeable
reasons, so called unknown unknowns [4] [18]. These range
from novel objects or vehicles appearing in traffic over
newly introduced traffic regulations up to massive structural
changes in traffic due to human drivers reacting to the
introduction of AVs. Hence, an integrated update process
and constant monitoring of AVs during their life cycle are
inevitable for SBT (G3).
B. Scenario Elicitation
Most published frameworks follow an expert- or data-
driven approach to elicit functional or logical scenarios.
Expert-driven approaches use a manifestation and formal-
ization of expert knowledge about the real world. Proposed
methods include the direct use of laws, regulations, system
specifications, as well as already existing logical scenarios
[19]. As an a priori formalization step, it has been proposed
to incorporate such knowledge into ontologies [20]. Based
on such formalized knowledge, experts can conduct safety
analyses to identify hazardous scenarios [21]. Scenarios can
also be elicited in a data-driven manner. For example, large-
scale observational studies can serve as a means to identify
hazardous events, e.g. by learning a neural network [22].
Those can in turn be transformed into logical scenarios, e.g.
by using the challenger framework [23], and can additionally
be attached with probability distributions from the observed
data [24]. Such a process can be enhanced by extending the
already existing data basis [25]. Besides investigating large
data sets, one can also closely investigate a concrete real-
world drive [26], which then allows for a parametrization into
a logical scenario. Finally, there exist attempts to combine
expert- and data-driven frameworks. In top-down approaches,
logical scenarios are classified by experts, e.g. on a keyword-
based scheme [27], and the attached probability distributions
are derived from real-world data. Orthogonally, bottom-
up approaches use expert analysis on data bases, e.g. a
Successive Odds Ratio Analysis [28] or a classification tree
approach [29], to classify observed concrete scenarios.
Expert-driven scenario elicitation necessitates defining a
set of relevant real-world phenomena to be considered im-
plicitly or explicitly, e.g. via an ontological representation.
This approach is prone to creating a gap between identified
and relevant phenomena. While this gap can be controlled
by using systematic methods and made visible by explicit
representations, completeness guarantees cannot be given.
Moreover, experts lack the combinatorial power for the
exhaustive exploration of the open context, increasing the
risk of an incomplete set of scenario classes. In that regard,
automated analyses are able to complement an expert-based
approach (SE1). Most data-driven approaches rely on the
existence of a sufficiently large data basis. It is assumed
that relevant phenomena leave traces in recorded data, for
example as causes of accidents in observational studies.
In this case, relevant phenomena have to be present either
directly in the data model or need to be manually identified
by examination of the recorded scenarios (SE2). If the data
basis is extended by collecting more data sets, the choice
of observation is up to expert judgment and arguments
must be made as to why this choice leads to scenario
classes that enable SBT. Regarding the location of data
collection, experts must argue that the chosen locations are
in some form representative for the targeted operational
design domain. This applies particularly to the validity of
measured real-world distributions and their generalizability.
For collecting data and evaluating concrete real-world drives,
it has to be decided which entities and relations shall be
observed in the real world. Additionally, appropriate tools
and measurement sensors with sufficient accuracy have to be
chosen purposefully and explicitly, in order for a downstream
safety argumentation to reason over the validity of such
decisions (SE3). Both expert- and data-driven approaches
have in common that they either elicit an arguably complete
classification of the scenario space, or need to reason on
why the exclusion of certain scenarios is applicable in the
current context (SE4). While a complete classification of
scenarios that covers the entire scenario space is essential for
SBT, such a decomposition does not reduce the overall test
effort. However, if sound arguments can be made why some
classes can be excluded altogether, omitting these classes
significantly reduces the required test effort later on.
C. Requirement Elicitation
Of particular importance for any safety-relevant applica-
tion is a systematic safety process that includes identification
of hazards and risks, derivation of safety goals and decompo-
sition of the high-level safety goals into safety requirements
on item and component level [30] [31]. For systems up
to SAE Level 2, this is well covered by ISO 26262 and
ISO/PAS 21448. For SAE Level ≥ 3, scenarios appear to
be an ideal starting point for the derivation and elicitation
of acceptance criteria. Junietz et al. examine how such a
quantified requirement definition can take place based on
acceptable risk levels [32].
The process of identifying and specifying requirements is
inherently bound to the problem of correctness (does the
specification match the actual requirement), completeness
(are all safety goals fully covered), consistency (the absence
of contradictions) and validity (are we specifying a useful
requirement in the first place) (RE1). Furthermore, for re-
quirements tested virtually, specific arguments must be made
with regards to measurability and computability. Here, the
number of virtually executed scenarios can grow extremely
large. Thus, the key elements of requirements need to be
observable and measurable in the virtual environment (RE2).
D. Test Derivation
1) Discretization: During test derivation, a discretization
step for a class L to a discrete class L˜ is usually performed to
reduce the test effort to a finite number of concretizations.
This step can be seen as a map CL 7→ CL˜ with |CL˜| <
∞. If the state space VL of a logical scenario L, i.e.
a whole scenario class, is fully described using a set of
bounded value ranges VL = V1 × · · · × Vn ⊂ Rn, some
of these parameters describe measurable continuous real-
world quantities. Examples contain the speed of an object
and rainfall quantity. Mapping each continuous value range
to a finite, discrete one, denoted by Vi 7→ V˜i, results in the
aforementioned logical scenario L˜ with a finite, discrete state
space VL˜ = V˜1 × · · · × V˜n ( VL.
While overly fine discretizations may produce many re-
dundant test cases [19], any discretization step leads to
gaps in the original state space, possibly resulting in undis-
covered safety violations [33]. One approach defines the
map CL 7→ CL˜ according to probability distributions of
the parameters [34], obtained from either synthesized or
real-world data. In both cases, however, the question of
the validity of the data arises. Discretization according to
distributions is more sophisticated than equidistant splitting
and leads to scenarios that resemble reality more closely, but
its usefulness depends on the fundamental assumption that
’probability of occurrence of a scenario correlates with its
relevance in terms of the safety argumentation’ [34]. Whether
this assumption is justified depends on the paradigm used
for the safety argumentation [35]. We note that unlikely pa-
rameter combinations could lead to critical outcomes. Thus,
discretization might lead to dismissing rare, critical scenarios
due to preeliminated parameter combinations (TD1).
2) Variation Methods: In order to generate test cases for
a given logical scenario L, it is necessary to instantiate the
parameters with concrete values [13]. For efficient testing, a
systematic approach for instantiation is required. This can be
done either deterministically, e.g. by stepping (equidistantly)
through VL or performing Boundary Value Analysis [36], or
stochastically, e.g. using Monte Carlo methods [37]. If we
attach probability distributions to each parameter value range
Vi (or a joint distribution defined on VL), the instantiation I
can be seen as a random variable that assigns concrete values
vi ∈ Vi to each parameter αi ∈ AL through sampling. Then,
one may sample I according to the real-world distributions
of the parameters w.r.t. all constraints and interrelations of
L. It is likely that these distributions are approximated from
either locally measured naturalistic data [38] or from valid
simulated data [37] [34]. Both cases assume that sampling I
according to real-world distributions enhances the value of
test cases for the safety argument.
A different approach argues that scenarios being critical
w.r.t. a suitable metric offer the most value for the safety
argument and should therefore be tested preferably [39].
However, as these rarely occur naturally [32], one has to
increase their significance during the sampling process. This
can be realized by sampling I. Here, a criticality metric
κ : S(CL) → [0, 1], that maps a discrete time series of
values T obtained from a simulation engine S to a scalar
measuring the criticality of a concrete scenario C ∈ CL, can
be optimized. This criticality-guided approach shifts much
of the methodical burden to the metrics. First, a criticality
metric κ has to reflect the real-world criticality accurately
[39] (TD2). A single metric is unlikely to capture all types
of critical phenomena so that several metrics in conjunction,
each capturing different aspects of criticality, are required
[40]. Moreover, each metric κ is evaluated on a time series
T = S(C) depending on S, where C = I(L) is described by
the parameters AL. Thus, sampling I in order to optimize κ
can only capture real-world criticalities that are (i) actively
influenced by the parameters AL and (ii) accurately com-
puted by S . Clearly, (i) depends on the scenario description
language and (ii) hinges on the validity of the simulation
environment and the utilized models. Influencing factors for
real-world criticality whose effects are not conveyed by this
process can thus not be revealed. Simple metrics such as
TTC incorporate only few parameters, but can be optimized
efficiently. More involved metrics cover more influencing
factors at the cost of higher computational effort [41]. When
defining a new metric, e.g. by combining known metrics and
taking a weighted sum, the complexity of the associated
optimization problem is determined by its mathematical
properties, e.g. being continuous, differentiable, or convex.
For each criticality metric κ a threshold cκ ∈ [0, 1] is
required in order to label a time series T = S(C) as critical
whenever κ(T ) ≥ cκ (TD3). Junietz et al. [42] suggest fitting
thresholds based on manually annotated scenarios which are
then used to learn binary classifiers. Criticality thresholds
can be used to define the critical subspace CL,κ,S = {C ∈
CL | κ(S(C)) ≥ cκ} ⊂ CL w.r.t. κ and S. The question
arises whether optimization algorithms reliably cover the set
CL,κ,S by finding critical concrete scenarios C ∈ CL,κ,S from
all of its connected components. If components of CL,κ,S are
missed entirely, one can no longer argue about testing all
critical instantiations of L (TD4). In order to prevent this,
optimization algorithms may have to be executed repeatedly,
using varying step lengths or starting points. In any case, the
dependency on the simulation engine S remains.
E. Test Execution
Depending on the stage of the development process, there
exists a diverse set of test execution methods [14]. An
essential strategy is mixed virtual-physical testing, i.e. re-
placing physical components with virtual ones [43]. For each
involved component and simulation model, a test method
needs to be chosen that provides valid test results [44].
In order for virtual testing to replace physical testing, the
corresponding virtual models have to be verified and vali-
dated against their physical counterparts [45]. The validity
of a simulation environment depends on the validity of many
TABLE I
OVERVIEW OF THE EXAMINED FUNDAMENTAL CONSIDERATIONS AROUND SCENARIO-BASED TESTING. EXAMPLES OF RELEVANT LITERATURE ARE
STATED FOR EACH PROCESS STEP.
ID Consideration Process Step Literature
G1 The term scenario, its qualifications and technical realizations are sufficiently expressive and
unambiguous.
General [2] [4] [13]
[17]
G2 If smoothness of a property of interest of the system is assumed, this assumption is asserted.
G3 The SBT process is adaptable to real-world changes.
SE1 An expert-based approach is executed systematically and supported by automation. Scenario Elicitation [19] [20] [21]
[22] [23] [24]
[25] [26] [27]
[28] [29]
SE2 An identification of all relevant phenomena is facilitated.
SE3 A data-driven approach uses representative measurement locations, devices and valid
probability distributions.
SE4 A decomposition of the test space into scenario classes is complemented either by evidence
for its completeness or an argumentation for the omission of classes.
RE1 Identified requirements are correct, consistent, complete and valid. Requirement Elicitation [30] [31] [32]
RE2 Key elements of requirements are observable and measurable in the environment.
TD1 Discretization does not preeliminate valuable test cases. Test Derivation [13] [19] [32]
[33] [34] [35]
[36] [37] [38]
[39] [40] [41]
[42]
TD2 Utilized criticality measures are validated.
TD3 Suitable thresholds for criticality measures are employed.
TD4 The critical subspace is explored systematically.
TX1 The simulation environment, all models and their interactions are validated. Test Execution [14] [43] [44]
[45] [46]
TE1 Test results are aggregated into a statement that supports the safety case. Test Evaluation [35] [47] [48]
[49]TE2 Statements about test coverage of scenario classes are derived using sound statistical
arguments.
individual models (e.g., environment models, behavior mod-
els, sensor models) as well as their interactions. Gathering
relevant real-world data for virtual models is a key challenge
in such a validation process, which also depends on the
employed notion of validity (cf. [46]). Thus, the question
how to validate simulation environments remains subject to
current research (TX1).
F. Test Evaluation
After executing test cases, they need to be evaluated
according to safety requirements. For SBT, these require-
ments can appear in the form of thresholds for criticality
metrics, being evaluated using a finite sequence of mea-
surements during the evolution of a concrete scenario [47].
It is possible to judge compliance of real-world tests with
qualitative requirements using experts. For virtual batch-
testing of scenarios, however, qualitative requirements need
to be mapped to criticality metrics and thresholds. PEGASUS
suggested a 4-stage-process for test case evaluation that
evaluates the aspects safety distances, absence of collision,
causality and mitigation [48]. Instead of binary test results,
[35] proposes test case evaluation on a more detailed ordinal
scale, incorporating knowledge about possible discrepancies
between the anticipated and actual category of a test case
depending on the underlying paradigm.
Formalizing test evaluation, we assume that executing a
concrete scenario C instantiated by I from L results in
a discrete time series of values T . This time series can
either be obtained by a simulation engine S or by real-
world measurements. We focus on the former here, i.e.
C = I(L) and T = S(C). A pass/fail-criterion κ(·) < cκ
is denoted as R w.r.t. a suitable criticality metric κ and
threshold cκ for L. The results of testing N instantiations
C1, . . . , CN of L, obtained from R, need to be aggregated.
A key challenge is to obtain a useful aggregate statement to
support the safety case (TE1). While a simple success ratio
1
N
∑N
i=1 1{S(Ci)|=R} can be adequate for comfort functions,
it might not be a good choice for testing safety goals.
This challenge becomes even more complex when evaluating
multiple metrics.
The map I and also S – for a probabilistic simulation
– can be seen as stochastic processes. Their composition
with a criticality metric κ is a random variable X = κ ◦
S ◦ I : L → [0, 1]. For test evaluation of an entire scenario
class L, for which not all instances can be tested, we need
to make a statistical statement about the system under test
failing a test coming from L (TE2). A possible strategy is to
estimate the probability of a random scenario derived from
L being critical w.r.t. κ, i.e. p = p(κ, L,S, I) = P (X ≥
cκ). The true distribution of p is unknown which requires an
estimate pˆ. Assuming the tested system is well-engineered
and the threshold cκ is well-chosen, we can expect p to be
very small. As explained in Section III-D, advanced Monte
Carlo methods can be applied to obtain an estimate pˆ. A
confidence statement about p using pˆ can then be interpreted
as a statistical statement about test coverage based on the
generated samples [49].
IV. RESULTS
As the result of our analysis, we present Table I, which
summarizes the fundamental considerations from Section III,
marked with an identifier. These considerations are grouped
according to the steps of the SBT process, as depicted by
Figure 1, and each step is annotated with examples of the
relevant literature.
In order to obtain a valid safety case for the release of
an AV, a coherent well-structured safety argumentation is
required. Such a safety case needs to argue why and how
the provided evidence satisfies the high-level safety require-
ments. One integral part of this evidence are the results of the
testing process. In this regard, Table I provides a collection
of considerations for which meaningful evidences need to be
gathered in order for SBT to support a safety case. However,
this collection is not exhaustive and additional considerations
may be necessary to establish a valid safety case.
V. CONCLUSION
A comprehensive review and analysis of the literature
concerning SBT for automated vehicles was performed. We
presented numerous arguments, principles and assumptions
that are fundamental to the automotive SBT approach. For
each step of the process, we analyzed the strengths and
weaknesses of the most promising contemporary approaches
in order to uncover potential gaps and inconsistencies. As
a result, we obtained a collection of fundamental consid-
erations that need to be substantiated with evidences. It
is subject to further research to provide approaches that
generate these evidences reliably. Finally, an exploration of
additional fundamental considerations complementing our
collection is likely to be necessary.
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